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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
On appeal, Olivia Kay Schultz has challenged, inter alia, the failure of the district 
court to sua sponte order a mental health evaluation pursuant to I.C. § 19-2522 prior to 
sentencing her for burglary. This Reply Brief is necessary to address some of the 
State's contentions on appeal with regard to this claim. 
First, the State has suggested on appeal that this issue is moot because a 
mental health evaluation was performed on Ms. Schultz while she was serving her 
second rider. However, as was originally noted in Ms. Schultz's Appellant's Brief, the 
case law is clear that such evaluations are to be ordered before sentencing. In addition, 
this Reply Brief is necessary to clarify that, contrary to the State's position on appeal, 
the mental health evaluation generated during Ms. Schultz's second rider failed to meet 
with the criteria for mental health evaluations pursuant to I.C. § 19-2522, and therefore 
this information was insufficient to adequately inform the district court's sentencing 
determination in any event. 
Second, the State has suggested on appeal that the manifest disregard standard 
that applies to review of an alleged error in failing to sua sponte order a mental health 
evaluation should be conducted solely under review of I.C.R. 32, rather than reading 
this provision in cot-rjunction with the stzndards contained in I.C. 9 19-2522 that govern 
when a mental health evaluation is mandatory for purposes of sentences. Because the 
Idaho Court of Appeals has previously considered, and rejected, this claim, the State's 
argument is in error. 
Although Ms. Schultz continues to assert that the district court abused its 
discretion when it failed to sua sponte order a mental health evaluation for purposes of 
sentencing, relinquished jurisdiction over her case, and when the court failed to sua 
sponte reduce her sentence upon relinquishing jurisdiction, she will rely on the 
arguments made within the Appellant's Brief, and will not reiterate those arguments 
herein. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedinc~s 
The Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings were previously 
articulated in Mr. Schultz's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply 
Brief, but are incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
ISSUE 
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it failed to sua sponte order a mental 
health evaluation for purposes of sentencing in this case? 
ARGUMENT 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Failed To Sua Sponte Order A Mental 
Health Evaluation For Purposes Of Sentencing In This Case 
A. Introduction 
While the State has asserted on appeal that there was no error in the district 
court failing to sua sponte order a mental health evaluation because one was conducted 
at a later date (during Ms. Schultz's second rider review hearing), the State's argument 
is misplaced. The ldaho Court of Appeals has already considered and rejected this 
claim, as was noted in the Appellant's Brief. Moreover, the State's assertion 
erroneously assumes that the limited examination conducted on Ms. Schultz during her 
period of retained jurisdiction was sufficient to meet with the dictates of I.C. § 79-2522. 
A review of this evaluation demonstrates that it was insufficient under the applicable 
legal standards governing such evaluations. As such, the State's contention that this 
issue is moot is meritless. 
Additionally, the State in this case has suggested that the standard that this 
Court applies on review of whether the district court erred in failing to sua sponte order 
a mental health evaluation for sentencing purposes turns exclusively on an examination 
of I.C.R. 32. However, this assertion has also previously been raised and rejected by 
the ldaho Court of Appeals. The proper standard of review for manifest disregard 
incorporates a review of both the provisions of I.C.R.32(d) and of the standards 
contained in I.C. § 19-2522, because the statute governing mental health evaluations 
sets forth the circumstances under which the district court is required to exercise its 
discretion in favor of obtaining a mental health evaluation, as authorized under the court 
rule. 
B. The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Failed To Sua Sponfe Order A 
Mental Health Evaluation For Purposes Of Sentencincl In This Case 
1. The Issue Reqardina The District Court's Failure To Sua Sponfe Order A 
Mental Health Evaluation For Purposes Of Sentencinq Is Not Moot In This 
Case 
The State has asserted, in response to Ms. Schultz's claim regarding the failure 
of the district court to sua sponte order a mental health evaluation at sentencing, that 
this issue is moot because a mental health evaluation was produced while Ms. Schutlz 
was serving her second period of retained jurisdiction. 
However, this argument ignores prior decisions from the ldaho Court of Appeals 
that have rejected this exact claim. As was originally set forth in Ms. Schultz's 
Appellant's Brief, prior case law makes clear that mental health evaluations that are 
mandated under I.C. § 19-2522 must be conducted prior to sentencing. See Sfafe v. 
Coonfs, 137 ldaho 150, 153, 44 P.3d 1205, 1208 (Ct. App. 2002) (see also Appellant's 
Brief, pp.10-I I .)  In addition, the ldaho Court of Appeals has also considered and 
rejected the propriety of the district court waiting until a defendant is serving his or her 
period of retained jurisdiction before ordering a psychological evaluation under 
i.C. 3 19-2522. Stafe v. Banburry, 145 Idaho 265, 268-269, 175 P.3d 63C, 534 
(Ct. App. 2007). The State fails to acknowledge this case law, much less provide this 
Court with any reason to depart from this established precedent. 
Even in absence of the case law indicating that I.C. § 19-2522 requires that 
mental health evaluations be ordered prior to sentencing, the State still could not 
establish that issue of the district court's failure to order a proper mental health 
evaluation was moot. This is because the evaluation conducted during Ms. Schultz's 
second rider was inadequate to meet the standards for such evaluations under 
I.C. 3 19-2522. The case law governing mental health evaluations makes clear that 
these evaluations must be adequate to meet with the criteria set forth in I.C. § 19-2522. 
See, e.g., Stafe v. Pearson, 108 Idaho 889, 890, 702 P.2d 927, 928 (Ct. App. 1985). 
The observations by the court in Pearson are instructive on this point: 
The more crucial issue before the court, in our view, relates to the 
inadequacy of the psychological evaluation. We agree with defendant 
Pearson's assertion that the evaluation, as submitted in this case, failed to 
fulfill the intent and spirit of the statute authorizing such evaluations. We 
find that the evaluation, which is part of the exhibits herein, merely gives 
conclusory statements to the effect that the defendant is an alcoholic with 
an anti-social personality and violent tendencies. The evaluation does not 
explain upon what tests or procedures these conclusions are based. It 
tends to reflect only a social interview with claimant, rather than a full- 
scale psychological evaluation. 
Id. In view of the gross deficiencies of the mental health evaluation that was produced 
in Pearson, the Court of Appeals ruled that this evaluation was insufficient to provide the 
district court with sufficient information "on which to make an educated, reasoned, 
appropriate sentencing decision." Id, at 891, 702 P.2d at 929. 
Contrary to the State's assertion, the mere fact that a document purporting to be 
a mental health evaluation was subsequently produced for the district court does not 
mean that this document is sufficient for purposes of i.C. § 19-2522. And a review of 
the evaluation conducted during Ms. Schultz's second rider demonstrates that it suffers 
from the exact deficiencies found to render the evaluation inadequate in Pearson. 
The mental health evaluation referred to by the State was attached to 
Ms. Schultz's addendum to the presentence evaluation that was dated December 10, 
2007. (Respondent's Brief, p.8.) As an initial matter, this evaluation appears to have 
been conducted by a licensed social worker, and not a psychiatrist or a licensed 
psychologist who would be in a position to engage in appropriate diagnostics. See 
I.C. § 19-2522(1). There is no description of what psychometrics or other diagnostic 
methods that were employed in conducting the evaluation. See I.C. § 19-2522(3)(a). 
The "evaluation" appears to rely entirely on an interview with Ms. Schultz and other 
employees at the correctional center and a review of Ms. Schultz's presentence 
investigation report. (See Mental Health Evaluation pp.1-2.) There is no diagnosis or 
evaluation of any of Ms. Schultz's mental conditions, although the report does describe 
some of the maladaptive behaviors that Ms. Schultz has exhibited. See I.C. 5 19- 
2522(3)(b). 
Because there was no diagnosis provided for Ms. Schultz's mental health 
conditions (presumably because the evaluator does not appear to be qualified to make 
medical diagnoses of this sort), there is likewise no analysis of the degree to which any 
of Ms. Schultz's mental conditions impacted her level of impairment or may have 
contributed to her underlying offense. See I.C. 19-2522(3)(c). 
Because there was no meaningful psychological diagnoses that were 
undertaken, the district court was similarly left with no information regarding what 
potential treatments were available for Ms. Schultz's mental conditions, nor with an 
analysis of the relative risks or benefits of treatment or nontreatment. See I.C. fj§ 19- 
2522(3)(d), (e). In fact, the only statutory factor addressed by this evaluation was the 
social worker's own beliefs regarding the potential risk of danger should Ms. Schultz be 
released into the community. See I.C. $ 19-2522(3)(f). And this conclusion is of 
minimal import given that it was the product largely of social interviews rather than being 
informed by a full-scale psychological evaluation. See Pearson, 108 ldaho at 890, 702 
P.2d at 928. 
In sum, the State's arguments regarding mootness have previously been 
considered and rejected in prior cases -the mandate of I.C. § 19-2522 is one that must 
be fulfilled prior to sentencing in those cases where a mental health evaluation is 
required. Moreover, even if this were not the case, the evaluation provided to the 
district court fails to meet virtually every criteria established for such evaluations, and 
therefore the State's suggestion that this evaluation was sufficient is without merit. 
2. The State Articulates The Incorrect Leqal Standards For Appellate Review 
Of An Assertion That The District Court Erred In Failinq To Sua Sponte 
Order A Mental Health Evaluation For Purposes Of Sentencing 
In this case, the State appears to argue that this Court's review of whether the 
district court acted in manifest disregard of I.C.R. 32 in the context of the failure to order 
a mental health evaluation is divorced from a review of whether a mental health 
evaluation was required for purposes of sentencing pursuant to I.C. § 19-2522. This 
same argument has previously been considered and rejected in State v. Durham, 146 
ldaho 364,366, 195 P.3d 723,726 (Ct. App. 2008). And there was good reason for the 
Court of Appeals to reject this claim. 
Generaily, when a statute anci a court r i le deal with the same subject matie: and 
share a common purpose, this Court reads the two provisions in conjunction with one 
another. The case law regarding the sua sponte duty of the district court reflects this 
principle through analyzing the provisions of I.C.R. 32(d) in conjunction with I.C. § 19- 
2522. Craner, 137 ldaho at 189, 45 P.3d at 845. See also Collins, 144 ldaho at 409, 
162 P.3d at 788; State v. McFarland, 125 ldaho 876, 881, 876 P.2d 158, 163 (Ct. App. 
1994); State v. Pearson, 108 ldaho 889, 890-892, 702 P.2d 927, 928-930 (Ct. App. 
1985). This Court similarly reads statutes and ldaho court rules in conjunction with one 
another in other contexts involving criminal trials or sentencing where the statute and 
the court rule deal with the same subject matter. See, e.g., Murillo v. State, 144 ldaho 
449, 452, n. l ,  163 P.3d 238, 241 (Ct. App. 2007) (recognizing co-extensive right to an 
interpreter in both statute and court rule); State v. Dorsey, 139 ldaho 149, 150-51, 75 
P.3d 203, 204-205 (Ct. App. 2003) (recognizing legal sufficiency of an information as 
being governed by both statute and court rule); State v. Pole, 139 ldaho 370, 372, 79 
P.3d 729, 731 (Ct. App. 2003) (citing to both statute and court rule for standards of 
probable cause hearing). This is also in accord with Idaho's well-established rule of 
statutory construction that statutes relating to the same subject matter are to be 
construed together. See, e.g., State v. Callaghan, 143 ldaho 856, 858, 153 P.3d 1202, 
1204 (Ct. App. 2006). 
Courts interpreting the duty of the district court to order a mental health 
evaluation sua sponfe focus directly on the mandatory language included in I.C. § 19- 
2522. See Craner, 137 ldaho at 189, 45 P.3d at 845. It is the plain language of 
I.C. § 19-2522 stating that the district court "shall appoint" a psychiatrist or psychologist 
to obtain a mental health evaluation, read in conjunction with the provisions of 
I.C.R. 32(d), that creates an independent duty on the part of the court to order a mental 
health evaluation under certain circumstances. Sfafe v. Coonfs, 137 ldaho 150, 152- 
153, 44 P.3d 1205, 1207-1208 (Ct. App. 2002). In fact, the court in Coonts appears to 
root the sua sponte duty of the district court to order a mental health evaluation entirely 
in the mandatory language of I.C. 3 19-2522, finding that "frustrations with defense 
counsel's lack of diligence do not, however, excuse the trial court from compliance with 
I.C. § 19-2522." Id. at 153, 44 P.3d at 1208. 
As stated by the court in Craner, "The legal standards governing the court's 
decision whether to order a psychological evaluation and report are contained in 
I.C. § 19-2522." Craner, 137 ldaho at 189, 45 P.3d at 845; see also Collins, 144 ldaho 
at 409, 162 P.3d at 788. Moreover, if there was sufficient evidence before the district 
court to determine that the defendant's mental condition would be a factor at 
sentencing, and the information before the district court does not satisfy the 
requirements of I.C. § 19-2522, this constitutes a manifest disregard of the provisions of 
I.C.R. 32(d). Craner, 137 ldaho at 190-191, 45 P.3d at 846-847. This is in accord with 
other decisions interpreting the provisions of I.C. § 19-2522(3) as providing the specific 
content to which a psychological report must conform to be within the proper exercise of 
the court's discretion under I.C.R. 32(d). See, e.g., Collins, 144 ldaho at 409, 162 P.3d 
at 788; McFarland, 125 ldaho at 881, 876 P.2d at 163; Pearson, 108 ldaho at 890-892, 
702 P.2d at 928-930. Applying the relevant case law, the question of compliance with 
the provisions of I.C. 3 19-2522 is inextricably intertwined with the analysis regarding 
whether the district court acted in manifest disregard of the provisions of I.C.R. 32(d). 
Here, the relevant issue involves the district court's discretion, and the statutory 
requirements that are attendant upon that discretion, with regard to mental health 
evaluations. I.C.R. 32(d) provides in relevant part that the decision as to whether to 
order a psychological evaluation is to be made by the sentencing judge. While it is 
within the discretion of the district court to order a psychological evaluation for purposes 
of sentencing, the legislature has placed constraints on the proper exercise of that 
discretion through enacting I.C. § 19-2522. Under certain circumstances - that being 
where there is reason to believe that the mental condition of the defendant will be a 
factor at sentencing and where the information already before the district court does not 
meet with the requirements of I.C. ?j 19-2522(3) -the legislature has made it mandatory 
that the district court exercise its discretion under 1.C.R 32(d) in favor of obtaining a 
mental health evaluation and the failure to do so constitutes manifest disregard. See 
Sfafe v. Craner, 137 Idaho 188, 189-191,45 P.3d 844, 845-847(Ct. App. 2002). 
To the extent that the State argues to the contrary in this case, the State's 
arguments are belied by the relevant case law governing when the district court has a 
sua sponte duty to order a mental health evaluation for use at sentencing. Under a 
proper evaluation of this claim, the district court erred when it failed to sua sponfe order 
a mental health evaluation for purposes of sentencing in this case. (See Appellant's 
Brief, pp.7-13.) 
CONCLUSION 
Ms. Schultz respectfully requests that this Court vacate her sentence and 
remand this case to district court for resentencing after a complete evaluation of her 
mental condition is made in compliance with I.C. § 19-2522. In the alternative, 
Ms. Schultz asks that this Court vacate the district court's order relinquishing jurisdiction 
and remand this case for further proceedings. Alternatively, she requests that this Court 
reduce her sentence as it deems appropriate. 
DATED this 5th day of March, 2010. 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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